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EXAMINING THE PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT UNDER
THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT
MARK A. MITCHELL
O N OCTOBER 31, 1979, the Department of Commerce Task
Force on Product Liability and Accident Compensation pro-
mulgated its Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA or
Model Act).' Sections 111 and 112 announce virtually across-the-
board application of comparative fault principles, reducing the
manufacturer's liability when the plaintiff's conduct or that of
a third party contributes to the harm. This comment will explain
and evaluate the application of comparative responsibility prin-
ciples and the Model Act's impact on the existing state law in
this area.
I. LACK OF UNIFORMITY
The concepts of products liability and comparative negligence
both originated in relatively recent times and their existence, as
well as their application, has varied throughout the states. Origi-
nally, a consumer who sought to assert liability against the manu-
facturer for injuries resulting from a defective product had to be
in privity of contract in addition to having to prove negligence.'
This "citadel of privity"' began to crumble in 1916 with Justice
Cardozo's opinion in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co." Cardozo
reasoned that the manufacturer "of a thing ... that is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made . . .
is under a duty to make it carefully."' Although the creation of a
negligence action removed the requirement of contractual privity,
the consumer was still required to prove that the defendant ex-
'MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as UPLA, MODEL ACT]. The Act is published as a model law for
use by the states at their election. Id. at 62,714.
'See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 at 641
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
' Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
4217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
5Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
posed the consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm and that the
defendant's actions produced the actual damage or loss.'
Initial attempts to avoid the burden of proving negligence' were
made under a warranty theory." If the express warranty of safety
was breached, the consumer had a cause of action.9 Although the
efficiency of the warranty theory was originally hindered through
the use of contractual disclaimers,"0 the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc." recognized the existence
of implied warranties and refused to enforce the contractual dis-
claimers, thereby accelerating the trend toward strict products
liability."
Since the substance of the products liability cause of action fol-
lowing Henningsen was in fact based upon strict liability, the
drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts decided to discard
the warranty label 3 and recognized an independent strict products
liability cause of action in tort under section 402A.' Section 402A
was first applied in 1963 by the California Supreme Court in
'W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 30 at 143.
1 See, e.g., Ashe, So You're Going to Try a Products Liability Case, 13 HAST.
L.J. 66 (1961).
8 See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932) (statement
in literature distributed by manufacturer of automobile that windshield was
shatterproof made manufacturer liable for injuries received when windshield
shattered, without any showing of negligence).
9 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 97 at 651.
10 Id. at 656.
t32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
'
2 See 2 M. FRIEDMAN & L. FRUMER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3A-143 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN & FRUMER].
13See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, Comment m (1965).
14RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT] reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and,
(b) the user or consumer has bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." The doctrine of strict
products liability in tort now is accepted and applied by a sub-
stantial majority of the courts." A few states, however, have not
recognized a strict tort liability cause of action in products lia-
bility, adhering instead to earlier negligence or warranty theories."
One reason for the recent trend toward adoption of a strict
products liability action in tort may be related to the expanding
scope of the area of products liability." As our "highly indus-
trialized" society continues to advance, both the quantity and com-
plexity of products increases," and the courts' role in adhering to
the policies behind products liability theory becomes increasingly
important.' The courts' role is especially important where the
manufacturer's decision to continue production is made with knowl-
edge of the possible defect and is based largely upon economics.21
Similar to the development of the theories supporting strict prod-
s 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (manufacturer held
liable despite plaintiff's inability to prove negligence). See 2 FRIEDMAN & FRUMER,
supra note 12, at 383.
"See FRIEDMAN & FRUMER, supra note 12, at 3B-13.
17 For a thorough survey on the abandonment of the privity requirement and
the adoption of strict tort liability throughout jurisdictions in the United States,
see generally FRIEDMAN & FRUMER, supra note 12, at 3-7.
"I1d. at 1-1.
9"Id. The aviation industry is a perfect example. Today's aircraft is a highly
complex product made up of highly complex components and the consequences
of a defective product in this industry are often grave. See generally S. J. Levy,
The Rights of Passengers-A View From the United States, in DIE PRODUK-
THAFTUNO IN DER LUFTUND RAUMFAHRT (PRODUCT LIABILITY IN Am SPACE
TRANSP.) 83-89 (1978) (Proceedings of an International Colloquium in Cologne,
Germany, 1977).
" There are basically three different theories for imposing strict liability on
the seller of a defective product. The first is known as enterprise liability, the
notion that industry should pay for the injuries it causes. Since the enterprise
can pass the loss on to consumers through an increase in price, the risks are
spread throughout society. See generally Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and
Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1173 (1952). Another theory, known
as the "spreading of losses" justification, is based upon the premise that losses
are least harmful if they are broadly spread, taking a series of small sums from
many people. See generally Freezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the
Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805, 809-10 (1930).
Finally, there is the deep pocket theory, "that a dollar removed from a rich
man caused the rich man less pain than a dollar removed from a poor man, and
that, therefore, shifting losses from the poor to the rich was in itself a good
thing." Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 527 (1961).
21 See note 188 infra.
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ucts liability, the use of comparative negligence principles and
their application to strict products liability actions has varied sub-
stantially among the states. The concept of comparative negli-
gence originated under the common law as a part of the law of
admiralty." It was first extended to other negligence actions by
Congress in a 1908 statute2 which was designed to prevent the
often harsh application of the common law defenses to claims
arising from injuries sustained by railroad employees." The con-
cept's popularity quickly increased, until today a majority of the
states have adopted comparative negligence in one form or an-
other.' The "pure" form of comparative negligence, which allows
the plaintiff to recover the proportion of his damages equivalent
to the defendant's negligence even if the plaintiff's negligence ex-
ceeds that of the defendant, has been adopted by eight states, four
by statute,2 four judicially." Twenty-three states have adopted
one of two versions of a "modified" comparative negligence system
which limits the plaintiff's right of recovery to cases in which
the plaintiff's negligence either is not as great as the defendant's
' See H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT 18 (1978).
2345 U.S.C. § 53 (1976):
In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any
such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the
provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries
to an employee, . . . the fact that the employee may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar any recovery, but
the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to such employee;...
24 H. WOODS, supra note 22, at 24.
2 See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as SCHWARTZ].
28MISS. CODE ANN. S 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. [Clv. PRAC.] LAW § 1411 (Mc-
Kinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
4.22.010 (Supp. 1979). See generally H. WOODS, supra note 22, at 79.
27 Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638,
275 N.W.2d 511 (1979). See generally H. WOODS, supra note 22, at 79.
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negligence,' or is not greater than that of the defendant.' A
limited number of jurisdictions apply comparative negligence prin-
ciples only when the plaintiff's negligence is slight, compared to
the defendant's gross negligence,' or when the plaintiff's negligence
is remote compared to the defendant's more direct negligence.31
There is also substantial disagreement among the states as to
the application of comparative negligence principles to a strict
products liability action. The decision has often turned upon the
state law's analysis of the products liability cause of action" or
the language of its comparative negligence statute. ' The traditional
criticism directed against a comparison of the two concepts was
simply that the fact-finder cannot compare "the 'apples' of negli-
gence with the 'oranges' of strict liability." A majority of the
commentators, however, submit that the two concepts can be com-
28 ARx. STAT. ANN. S 27-1764 (1979) (couched in terms of fault rather than
negligence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156
(1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1980) (couched in terms of
fault); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, 5 13 (West
Supp. 1979-1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); Wvo. STAT. S 1-1-109
(1977). West Virginia recently adopted this version judicially in Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., - W.Va. -, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979). See generally
SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 73.
29 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572 (1979); HAWAn REV. STAT. S 663-31 (1976);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1979); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. 5 27-1-702 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1979-
1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 18,470 (1977); S.C. CODE § 15-1-300 (1977); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 895.045 (West Supp. 1979-
1980). See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 73.
30NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1979) (plaintiff's negligence slight in comparison with defendant's).
11 See Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919) (Tennessee
Supreme Court held that plaintiff's contributory negligence, if only remotely con-
nected with cause of injury, will not bar plaintiff's recovery but will be considered
only in mitigation of damages).
2 One of the first cases to apply comparative negligence to strict products
liability was Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). The court
reasoned that strict liability was analogous to negligence per se, which can be
compared with the plaintiff's negligent conduct. Id. at 461, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
3 See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (court
held that Oklahoma's comparative negligence statute, which is expressly limited
to negligence actions, does not extend to strict product liability actions).
4 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,735. See Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) in
Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 16 (1977).
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pared,' and it appears that most of the states which have adopted
comparative negligence provisions are willing to apply them to
products liability actions."0
The courts have differed as to the grounds upon which a basis
for comparison may be found. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, one
of the pioneers in comparing the two concepts, reasoned in Dipple
v. Sciano," that strict products liability was analogous to negli-
gence per se; when viewed in this light, the defendant's liability
could be compared with the plaintiff's negligent conduct." This
"negligence per se" theory subsequently was used to justify the
inclusion of the concept of strict liability in the Uniform Com-
parative Fault Act,' an act heavily relied upon in creating section
111 of the UPLAi4 The theory, however, is not without its critics.
At least one commentator has found fault with the use of the
"negligence per se" theory as a means of comparison because the
I See generally Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases,
42 J. AIR L. & COM. 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brewster]; Fleming, The
Supreme Court of California 1974-1975, Foreward: Comparative Negligence at
Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 268-71 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Fleming]; Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42
TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]; Vetri, Products Lia-
bility: The Developing Framework for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REV. 292 (1975);
Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
' See Brown v. Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying
Oregon law); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975)
(applying Mississippi law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp.,
411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho law); Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kennedy v. City of
Sawyer, 4 Kan. App. 2d 545, 608 P.2d 1379 (1980); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc.,
Minn. -, 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118
N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d
344 (Tex. 1977); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Contra Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying
Nebraska law); Parzini v. Center Chemical Co., 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d
700 (1975); Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 553 P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976); Kirk-
land v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Seay v. Chrysler
Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
3737 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
38 Id. at 461, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
"The Act is set out in an appendix to Professor Wade's analysis of its pro-
visions. Wade, supra note 35, at 392.
'See UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,735.
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standard for determining "negligence per se" is inconsistent with
the "reasonable person" negligence standard."1
The Texas Supreme Court has found a common ground for the
comparison of negligence and strict liability through the issue of
causation. In General Motors Corp v. Hopkins," the court indi-
cated that the plaintiff's recovery would be limited "to that portion
of his damages equal to the percentage of the cause contributed
by the product defect." Similarly, a concurrence to the Alaska
Supreme Court opinion in Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc.," has approved of the use of causation, explaining
that the "[a]doption of a comparative causation approach would
avoid the theoretical problems inherent in any attempt to com-
pare relative degrees of fault where the defendant's negligence,
or fault is determined by the principles of strict liability."' Pro-
fessor Twerski advocates the inclusion of the concept of cause
in fact into the comparative fault doctrine as a step away from the
unrealistic "all-or-nothing" rule of causation." He concludes that
"[j]uries should be allowed to consider the likelihood at a per-
centage basis that a party's activities caused harm."'
The use of comparative causation as a replacement for com-
4Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43
Mo. L. REV. 431, 439-41 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fischer]. According to
Professor Fischer, the two standards differ when viewed with regard to the role
of the trier of fact. "In negligence per se cases the court determines that a legis-
latively established specific standard of conduct shall constitute the standard
of conduct of a reasonable person ....... The role of the jury is merely to
determine the facts, i.e., whether the statute was violated. Id. He reasons that,
in contrast, section 402A contains no specific standard of conduct; therefore,
"the jury could conclude that no reasonable precaution on behalf of the manu-
facturer would have prevented the creation of the defect." This, he argues,
would yield the conclusion that the defendant was not at fault, barring the
plaintiff from any recovery. Id. at 441. Professor Fischer concludes that the
most satisfactory way to consider the plaintiff's conduct is to compare it to that
of a hypothetical reasonable person under similar circumstances. Id. at 449.
4548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) (plaintiff was seriously injured when his
automobile went out of control, allegedly due to defective carburetor which
plaintiff had attempted to fix prior to accident).
3Id. at 352.
4555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976).
45 Id. at 47 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
4Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine
of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403, 413 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Twerski].
"4Id. at 413.
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paring fault, however, would often produce harsh results and
would defeat the rationale behind both products liability and
comparative negligence." The lack of a "functional relationship
between physical causation and personal culpability" is clearly
illustrated by Professor Schwartz's example' of an intoxicated
motorcyclist who, speeding at eighty miles per hour, loses control
of his cycle, crosses into another lane of traffic and collides with
a large truck." "In terms of pure physical causation, perhaps an
expert could testify that the truck supplied 95% of the force that
killed the motorcyclist .... Nevertheless, the jury's line of inquiry
under comparative negligence does not focus on physical causation;
rather, it considers and weighs culpability.""
A third theory used to justify the comparison of strict products
liability and comparative negligence is based upon a comparison
of the respective fault of the parties. In Sun Valley Airlines, Inc.
v. Avco-Lycoming Corp.," a federal district court, applying Idaho
law, reasoned that "[the manufacturer is under a duty to produce
a product which is free from unreasonably dangerous conditions.
A violation of that duty constitutes blameworthiness or culpability
or sense of legal fault."'" The manufacturer's inherent fault, in
marketing a defective product, can therefore be balanced against
the plaintiff's fault pertaining to the particular misconduct."' The
most persuasive argument supporting a comparison of fault be-
tween the parties is the concept's inherent fairness. In Daly v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.," the California Supreme Court explained:
[O]ur reason for extending a full system of comparative fault
to strict products liability is because it is fair to do so. The
law consistently seeks to elevate justice and equity above the
exact contours of a mathematical equation. We are convinced
4 See Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Butaud
v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 38 OIO ST. L.J. 883, 890 (1977).
49Fischer, supra note 41, at 446.
50 SCHWARTZ, supra note 25, at 276.
3I Id. at 276.
52 Id.
53411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976).
"Id. at 602.
"See Brewster, supra note 35, at 118; Fleming, supra note 35, at 270.
"20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
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that in merging the two principles what may be lost in symmetry
is more than gained in fundamental fairness."
Daly, which was a 4-3 decision, reflects the conflict among
authorities throughout the states over the application of both com-
parative negligence and strict products liability in tort, and over
their application to each other. As one commentator concluded,
"the split on the Daly court clearly indicates that the debate on
the relationship of comparative negligence to strict products lia-
bility is far from over."58
II. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Section 111-Administration of Comparative Responsibility
In an effort to facilitate the unification of products liability
principles and to determine what effect a plaintiff's negligent con-
duct will have upon his cause of action, the Model Act announces
the application of comparative responsibility principles to all
claims brought under it." Under section 111(A), the claimant's
damages are reduced proportionately according to the measure of
responsibility attributed to him."
The Act requires the fact finder, unless all the parties agree
otherwise, to answer special interrogatories which indicate the
amount of damages to which each claimant would be entitled if
comparative responsibility principles were not considered."' The
special interrogatories also require the fact finder to indicate each
party's percentage of the total responsibility for each claim, which
is then allocated to each claimant, defendant or to any other per-
son or entity who could be responsible for the injury." If the fault
of an employer or co-employee is considered, the claimant's dam-
ages are reduced by the amount of the worker compensation bene-
57Id. at 742, 575 F.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
58 FRISHMAN, 1978 ANN. SURVEy AM. L. 577, 591.
5944 Fed. Reg. at 62,734. (UPLA S 111(A)).
60 Id.
:lId. (UPLA § Ill (B) (1) (a) ).
62Id. at 62,734-35. (UPLA § 111(B)(1) (b)). For example, the trier of fact
may determine that the plaintiff himself is responsible for ten percent of his
damages, that the manufacturer is responsible for sixty percent of the plaintiff's
damages and that some other party whose conduct falls within one of the pro-
visions of Section 112 is responsible for thirty percent of the plaintiff's damages.
1981]
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fits received by the claimant or by the percentage of responsibility
apportioned to that employer or co-employee, whichever is greater.'
The claimant's damages are also reduced by the percentages of
responsibility apportioned to a party who has been released from
liability."4 In determining the percentage of responsibility of each
party, the fact finder is to consider both the nature of each party's
conduct and the extent of the proximate causal relation between
the conduct and the damages claimed."
The court, in addition to entering judgment against each party
who is liable, is to determine each party's equitable share of the
obligation for purposes of contribution." The rules of joint and
several liability apply unless a party is responsible for a distinct
harm or unless there is some other reasonable basis for apportion-
ing that party's responsibility, in which case that party will be
severally liable."'
If a motion is made within one year from the date of judgment,
the court will determine whether all or part of a joint tortfeasor's
share of the obligation is uncollectible" If it is, the uncollectible
amount is reallocated among the other joint tortfeasors according
to their respective percentages of responsibility."'
B. Section 112-Conduct Aflecting Comparative Responsibility
The Model Act, in section 112,"° sets out four types of conduct
which may affect the claimant's comparative responsibility, re-
ducing his damages.' First, the claimant is not required to in-
spect the product for a defective condition." If the seller of the
product, however, can prove that the injury resulted from a de-
fective condition which was apparent to an ordinary, reasonably
prudent person without inspection, the claimant's damages are
'Id. at 62,735. (UPLA § 111(B)(2)).
"Id.
65Id. (UPLA 5 111(B)(3)).
"Id. (UPLA § 111(B)(4)).
6 7 Id. (UPLA § 111(B) (5)).




"2Id. (UPLA S 112(A)(1)).
SPECIAL PROJECT
subject to reduction to the extent that the claimant thus was re-
sponsible for his injury."' A non-claimant's failure to observe a
defective condition which would be apparent to an ordinary pru-
dent person will not reduce the plaintiff's recovery."
Another type of conduct, commonly known as an assumption of
the risk, also may affect the claimant's recovery. The Act states
that if a product seller can prove that the claimant knew about
the defective condition and voluntarily used the product or volun-
tarily assumed the risk of the harm, and if in doing so the claim-
ant did not act as an ordinary prudent person, his damages will be
subject to reduction. ' This provision expressly allows the fact
finder to place sole responsibility on the claimant." An optional
provision subjects the claimant's damages to apportionment if a
product user other than the claimant knew about the defective
condition and voluntarily and unreasonably used or stored the
product, causing the claimant's harm."
Misuse, the third category of conduct, is defined as action by
the product user in a manner that would not be expected of an
ordinary prudent person who would be likely to use the product
under similar circumstances." If the product seller can prove that
misuse of the product by the claimant or some third party has
caused the harm, the claimant's damages are subject to reduction
or apportionment to the extent that the misuse was a cause of the
harm." This provision also allows the trier of fact to find that the
harm arose solely from misuse of the product, in which case the
plaintiff would be denied recovery." The trier of fact also may
find that a third party who had misused a product and who is not
immune under state or federal law may be subject to liability to
the claimant.8'
The fourth type of conduct which may affect the claimant's re-
-aId. (UPLA 5 112(A) (2)).
-
41d. (UPLA § 112(A)(3)).
- Id. (UPLA S 112(B)(1)).
76 I. at 62,736-37.
77 Id. at 62,737. (UPLA 5 112(B)(2)).
78 Id. (UPLA § 112(C)(1)).
-Jd. (UPLA S 112(C)(2)).
80Id.
81Id. (UPLA § 112(C)(3)).
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covery deals with a product's alteration or modification." The
Act defines "alteration or modification" as a change of the design,
construction or formulation of the product, or a change or re-
moval of warnings or instructions which accompanied or were
displayed on the product." The definition also includes the failure
to observe the requirements of routine care and maintenance, ex-
cepting ordinary wear and tear."4 If the product seller can prove
that the alteration or modification by the claimant or some third
party caused the claimant's harm, the claimant's damages are sub-
ject to reduction or apportionment to the extent that the alteration
or modification was a cause of the harm." This provision also allows
the trier of fact to find that the harm arose solely because of the
product's alteration or modification." This provision is not applic-
able if the alteration or modification was in accordance with the
product seller's instructions or specifications;7 if it was, made with
the express or implied consent of the product seller;"8 or if it was
conduct that was reasonably anticipated, and the product lacked
instructions or adequate warnings pertaining to the alteration or
modification." The trier of fact also is allowed to determine that
a third party who has altered or modified the product and who is
not immune under state or federal law may be subject to liability
to the claimant.'"
III. IMPACT OF THE UPLA UPON THE EXISTING RULES
PERTAINING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF
A. Failure to Discover a Defective Condition
Section 112(A) provides:
(1) Claimant's Failure to Inspect. A claimant is not required
to have inspected the product for a defective condition. Failure
82 Id.
"8Id. (UPLA 5 112(D)(1)).
8 Id.
851d. (UPLA 5 112(D)(2)).
so6Id.
87Id. (UPLA § 112(D)(2)(a)).
8Id. (UPLA § 112(D) (2) (b)).
89Id. (UPLA § 112(D) (2) (c)).
90d. (UPLA § 112(D)(3)).
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to have done so does not render the claimant responsible for the
harm caused or reduce the claimant's damages.
(2) Claimant's Failure to Observe an Apparent Defective Con-
dition. When the product seller proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the claimant, while using the product, was injured
by a defective condition that would have been apparent, without
inspection, to an ordinary, reasonably prudent person, the claim-
ant's damages shall be subject to reduction....
(3) A Non-Claimant's Failure to Inspect for Defects or to Ob-
serve an Apparent Defective Condition. A non-claimant's failure
to inspect for a defective condition or to observe an apparent
defective condition that would have been obvious, without inspec-
tion, to an ordinary reasonably prudent person, shall not reduce
claimant's damages."'
Although the Model Act purports to require no inspection of
the defective product, 2 the claimant is required "to observe an
apparent defective condition."'" The courts are in general agree-
ment that the buyer's failure to inspect the goods and to discover
any defect will not relieve the seller of liability."4 Support for this
position has been reinforced by Comment n 5 to section 402A
of the Restatement." A few states have reached a different con-
clusion when the hazard was obvious 7 or was foreseeable by a
reasonable person.'
91 UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,736.
02See text accompanying note 72 supra.
3See text accompanying note 73 supra.
94See 1 FRIEDMAN & FRUMER, supra note 12, at 395.
95RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965):
Since the liability with which this section deals is not based upon
negligence of the seller, but is strict liability . . . [c]ontributory
negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against the possibility of its existence....
9" See note 13 supra. See De Pree v. Nutone, Inc., 422 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.
1970).
9 7 Aubum Mach. Works Co., Inc. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979)
(Florida Supreme Court rejected patent danger doctrine, but held that obvious-
ness of hazard is defense to manufacturer's liability, and also is applicable to
comparative negligence principles). The patent danger rule prevents recovery
based upon a negligent design theory where the danger is patent or obvious.
The defense was often asserted when the injury was causd by moving parts of
machinery not protected by safety devices. See generally 1 FRIEDMAN & FRUMER,
supra note 12, at § 118.8(8).
9 See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978)
(New Hampshire Supreme Court held that plaintiff's misconduct could be corn-
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The drafters of the Model Act justified the distinction between
ordinary defects and those "defects... apparent, without inspec-
tion, to an ordinary reasonably prudent person" as a means to
reduce the "considerable litigation and expense" pertaining to the
issue of the plaintiff's knowledge of the defect.9 Although the
justification may seem convincing at first glance, it is submitted that
the drafters' distinction will not appreciably reduce litigation and
expense but will only shift the key issue from the question of
knowledge of the defect to the question of whether the defect was
apparent. The latter question was vividly illustrated by the drafters'
example of a plaintiff with good eyesight who eats a candy bar
which has bright green worms crawling on it."' The drafters' posi-
tion is that the above example illustrates a defective condition that
can be discovered without inspection of the product.1"' Professors
Twerski and Weinstein, in an article" evaluating a draft of the
Model Act,"3 turned the argument around to support their conten-
tion that requiring the claimant to notice the apparent defective
condition is, in substance, requiring the claimant to inspect the
product."'
pared causally in products liability action). New Hampshire traditionally had
recognized that the plaintiff's failure to discover or to foresee dangers which
an ordinary person would have discovered or foreseen was a defense to claims
based upon strict products liability. Stephen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H.
248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970); Cadling v. Paslia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622,
345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973) (contributory fault includes failure to exercise such
reasonable care as would have disclosed defect).
9 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737. Since the existence of the product seller's defense
in most jurisdictions has turned upon whether the plaintiff had knowledge of the
defect, the issue has been an important one. See Fincher v. Surrette, 365 So. 2d
860 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (no defense for manufacturer where plaintiff testified
she was not aware that machinery was moving).
10 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
101 Id.
" Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Law-
A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 220 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as
Twerski & Weinstein].
1 3 DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
14Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 102, at 249. Professors Twerski and
Weinstein reasoned that obviously the plaintiff would not have eaten the candy
bar if he had noticed the worms. He did not notice the worms because he reason-
ably did not expect the candy bar to have worms. Therefore, his recovery is
diminished because he did not look before he ate--clearly imposing a duty to
inspect for defects. Id.
SPECIAL PROJECT
B. Claimant's Assumption of the Risk
Section 112(B) provides:
(B) Use of a Product With a Known Defective Condition.
(1) By a Claimant. When the product seller proves by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the claimant knew about the
product's defective condition, and voluntarily used the product or
voluntarily assumed the risk of harm from the product, the claim-
ant's damages shall be subject to reduction to the extent that the
claimant did not act as an ordinary reasonably prudent person
under the circumstances. Under this Subsection, the trier of fact
may determine that the claimant should bear sole responsibility
for harm caused by a defective product. . .. "
Originally, the drafters drew a distinction between a claimant's
assumption of the risk which was clearly unreasonable and that
assumption of the risk where the reasonableness was uncertain.0
In the former situation the claimant was to be barred from recovery,
but in the latter instance the claimant's damages were only to be
subject to reduction.'" Professors Twerski and Weinstein, in dis-
covering this "jurisprudential anomaly," pointed out that a determi-
nation of unreasonableness by a judge would bar recovery; how-
ever, if a jury made the same determination, the claimant would not
be barred.' The drafters responded by eliminating the distinction,
and section 112(B) is now in substantial agreement with the com-
mentators'" as well as with most of the states which recognize the
application of comparative negligence to strict products liability."0
Even in the early days of the acceptance of strict products lia-
105 UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
10 DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LiABITY ACT, supra note 103, at 3000.071d.
'
0sTwerski & Weinstein, supra note 102, at 250.
"o See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence
To Misuse And Assumption of the Risk, 43 Mo. L. REV. 643, 662 (1978);
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 181; Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Frame-
work for Analysis, 54 OR. L. REv. 293, 313 (1975). But see Twerski & Weinstein,
supra note 102, at 253 (claimant's assumption of risk, even though voluntary and
unreasonable, should not diminish recovery if harm that took place was foresee-
able); Walkowiak, Reconsidering Plaintiff's Fault in Product Liability Litigation:
The Proposed Conscious Design Choice Exception, 33 VAND. L. REV. 651, 679
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Walkowiak] (when product's defect is result of con-
scious design, plaintiff's conduct should not be considered).
110 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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bility, a substantial portion of the states recognized the plaintiff's
"assumption of risk" as a complete defense."' One reason for this
broad recognition of the defense was Comment n to section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts, ' which explained that "the
form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and com-
monly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this Section . *.. .,. One area of confusion in this context
is the requirement of unreasonableness in an assumption of risk
defense. Although the drafters of the Restatement and most of
the courts that have recognized the defense have included unrea-
sonableness as an ingredient of an assumption of risk defense,"'
other courts have applied the defense where the plaintiff had full
knowledge of the product's defects and continued to use it, re-
gardless of whether his conduct was reasonable in doing so. ' At
least one court has discounted this difference in application as
"more theoretical than real, since in many instances a plaintiff who
has full knowledge of the defective condition, and yet proceeds to
use the product, will be acting unreasonably. ' .. The Model Act's
clarification of this problem, reducing the claimant's damages only
when he fails to act as an "ordinary reasonably prudent person,"'"..
should help to unify the application of the condition of unreason-
ableness in an assumption of risk defense. The Model Act's posi-
tion is also favorable in its amelioration of the often harsh result
which accompanies a defense based solely on the plaintiff's knowl-
. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240, 253-56 (1972).
" See note 95 supra.
"
3 1d. See note 1II supra.
114 See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d
209 (Alaska 1975); 0. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248
(1968); Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975);
Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Johnson v. Clark Equip.
Co., 274 Or. 403, 547 P.2d 132 (1976); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71 (1976).
"'See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305
(1970); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Rourke
v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1975).
"
6 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., - W. Va. -, 253 S.E.2d 666,
684 (1979).
"
7 See text accompanying note 105 supra.
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edge of the product's dangerous condition. For example, an
employee, severely injured while operating a defective machine,
may be held to have assumed the risk, thus barring or substantially
reducing his recovery, solely because of his knowledge of the dan-
gerous condition. '18 The New Jersey Supreme Court has realized
the potential unfairness of such a result, reasoning, in Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Machinery Co.,11' that "an employee engaged
at his assigned task on a plant machine . . . has no meaningful
choice. Irrespective of the rationale that the employee may have
unreasonably and voluntarily encountered a known risk, we hold
as a matter of policy that such an employee is not guilty of con-
tributory negligence.... The result in Suter finds support in the
article written by Professors Twerski and Weinstein which ques-
tions the voluntariness of such an act and also suggests its fore-
seeability by the manufacturer.1"
In sharp contrast to the persuasive arguments supporting greater
protection for an employee who is responsible for operating a
dangerous machine, the Model Act offers an optional section
which could reduce the manufacturer's liability even though the
claimant was in no way responsible for the injuries he has suffered.
Section 112(B) (2) provides:
If the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence
nS E.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
11981 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
1SSuter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 158, 406 A.2d
140, 148 (1979).
21 Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 102, at 251. The authors question the
voluntariness of a plaintiff's "conscious choice to utilize a piece of dangerous
machinery in an employment setting." Id. Citing Barkewich v. Billinger, 432
Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968), the authors argue that an employee who was
seriously injured while attempting to remove an object which was jamming a
machine should not have his damages reduced. Although the plaintiff's actions
were neither involuntary nor reasonable, his decision was made in a split second.
In contrast, the manufacturer's decision is made with great deliberation and
with cost and marketing factors in mind. Finding the plaintiff's actions to be
foreseeable, Twerski and Weinstein conclude that the product should be manu-
factured to protect a "Barkewich-type plaintiff from his own foolish decision
making." Twerski and Weinstein, supra note 102, at 253.
The above argument is especially appealing in an "employee-dangerous
machine" setting; however, it is submitted that the same result can be accom-
plished without specifically carving out an exception to the rule. The plaintiff's
conduct could arguably be considered reasonable given the split second require-
ment for making the decision and the duties related to his employment.
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that a product user, other than the claimant, knew about a prod-
uct's defective condition, but voluntarily and unreasonably used
or stored the product and thereby caused claimant's harm, the
claimant's damages shall be subject to apportionment . ... "
The drafter's rationale for this section is that if some third party
voluntarily and unreasonably exposes the claimant to the product's
risks, that person should be liable for the damages which result."
The drafters cite two cases, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Loveland Gas
& Electric Co." and Drazen v. Otis Elevator Co., as analogous
support for shifting liability when a third party's actions are an
intervening cause.' 0 Those cases, however, were negligence actions
under which liability was not based upon a policy of primary loss
reduction." Moreover, the harsh result which is possible when an
otherwise responsible employer is immune under a workmens com-
pensation law is acknowledged.' Professor Phillips has also found
fault in replacing the manufacturer's liability with that of the third
party when the latter had actual knowledge of the danger."' He
advocates a different result, however, if the third party's conduct
involves a failure to pass on a warning from the manufacturer or
a misuse which negates the defectiveness of the product."'
On the other hand, notions of fairness reinforce the idea that
the third party should be liable for the damages for which he is
responsible. A suggested compromise is to hold the manufacturer
M44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
'Id. at 62,738.
'2 369 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1966) (gas company not negligent in supplying
tank from which gas seeped into building since plaintiff's knowledge of dangers
and opening of valve were intervening causes).
'-296 R.I. 114, 189 A.2d 693 (1963) (manufacturer of escalator handrail
not negligent or liable for injuries sustained by guests where store owner knew
of similar accidents but did not notify manufacturer).
" 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,738.
... See generally Walkowiak, supra note 109.
12 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,738.
I" Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law Of Products Liability, 28
DRAKE L. REv. 317, 372 (1978-1979). Professor Phillips argues that a distinction
should not be drawn between a third party's failure to observe an apparent de-
fective condition and that third party's knowledge of the dangerous condition
since "[t]he third party rarely intends to cause the plaintiff injury. Where there
is no such intent, the third party's failure to prevent the injury is attributable to
his inadvertence, regardless of whether he actually knew or merely should have
known of the danger." Id.
11 Id. at 372-73.
SPECIAL PROJECT
jointly liable to the claimant for the third party's misconduct,
allowing the manufacturer to recover the third party's portion of
the damages from that party in a later suit. The burden of collect-
ing this sum, as well as the risk of encountering an immune de-
fendant, is therefore on the manufacturer, not the claimant. 3 '
This is entirely appropriate since it is the manufacturer, not the
claimant, who placed the defective product on the market.
C. Misuse of a Product
Section 112(C) provides:
(1) "Misuse" occurs when the product user does not act in a
manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent
person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar
circumstances.
(2) When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that product misuse by a claimant, or by a party other
than the claimant or the product seller, has caused the claimant's
harm, the claimant's damages shall be subject to reduction or
apportionment to the extent that the misuse was a cause of the
harm. Under this subsection, the trier of fact may determine that
the harm arose solely because of product misuse....
(3) Under this Subsection, subject to state and federal law re-
garding immunity in tort, the trier may determine that a party or
parties who misused the product and thereby caused claimant's
harm should bear partial or sole responsibility for harm caused by
the product and are subject to liability to the claimant.'"
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the existence of the manu-
facturer's defense of misuse has turned upon the foreseeability of
"I' The Model Act, in the absence of this suggestion, is not clear as to when
joint and several liability will be imposed. Section 111(B) (5) states that joint
and several liability should not apply "when there is some other reasonable basis
for apportioning that party's responsibility for the harm." 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,735.
This language should not be construed as authorization for limiting the product
seller's liability to the percentage of damages for which he is found respon-
sible. In their analysis, the drafters indicated that the common law rules of
joint and several liability continue to apply. Id. at 62,736. They cited as support
for this view the comment to section four of the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act which explained that "[jioint-and-several liability under the common law
means that each defendant contributing to the same harm is liable to him for
the whole amount of the recoverable damages." Wade, supra note 35, at 398.
Even if the drafters intended that the product seller should not be jointly
and severally liable for the third party's portion of liability, it is submitted that
such a provision places a potentially heavy burden on the wrong party.
112 UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
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the misuse." If the plaintiff's misuse of the product was foresee-
able, his conduct would not affect his recovery."a' As might be
expected, the cases do not follow any rational pattern." For ex-
ample, striking the face of a hammer against the face of another
hammer in order to wedge its claws under a nail head was held
to be unforeseeable misuse." The use of a fourteen ounce geolo-
gist's hammer "guaranteed unbreakable in all normal use""' 7 to
break open a large rock was held to be foreseeable conduct."' Also
held to be foreseeable conduct were factual situations involving a
child's drinking furniture polish".. and the possibility of ground
coffee being eaten."
The commentators, although generally agreeing that foresee-
ability alone should not be the controlling factor,1 ' are in sub-
stantial disagreement as to the application of the defense of product
misuse. Professor Schwartz, who played an active role in the
UPLA's creation' and who has been in agreement with most of
its provisions, has advocated that the plaintiff's claim be dis-
missed when his conduct was unforeseeable, if he thus was respon-
sible for a portion of the damages."' In contrast, Professor Twerski
has argued that the assertion of product misuse as a defense should
only be upheld on a case by case basis and that foreseeability is
not such an important factor.' According to Twerski, more im-
portant factors include "whether the basic purposes of product
liability law will be furthered by permitting the affirmative defense"
" See 1 FRIEDMAN & FRUMER, supra note 12, at 404.
1341d.
" See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence
and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 96 (1972).
"' Odekirk v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 174 (1960) (applying Illinois law).
"" Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90, 92, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1972).
iao Id. at 94, 99, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 827, 832.
InSpruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (applying
Virginia law).
10 Maddox Coffee Co. v. Collins, 46 Ga. App. 220, 167 S.E. 306 (1932).
'41 See Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Risk, 43 Mo. L. REV.
643 (1978); Twerski, supra note 46, at 428; Wade, supra note 35, at 384.
'" Professor Schwartz was chairman of the Task Force which drafted the
Model Act. 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979).
'4' Schwartz, supra note 35, at 172-73.
'"Twerski, supra note 46, at 430.
SPECIAL PROJECT
and whether the type of misuse concerns product maintenance or
product integrity." Professor Wade also fails to see any meaning-
ful difference between foreseeable and unforeseeable conduct, but
in a different context." According to Professor Wade, if the manu-
facturer produces a defective product "and the buyer misuses the
product in a way that makes it dangerous to him," comparative
fault principles should apply regardless of whether the misuse was
foreseeable." '
One of the reasons for these conflicting theories may be the
substantially different effects that different forms of misuse may
have on a products liability lawsuit. For example, a plaintiff's mis-
use of the product may negate the existence of a defect, preventing
the plaintiff from having a valid cause of action."' Misuse may
also negate an essential portion of the plaintiff's cause of action
through its effect on principles of causation. Despite the existence
of a defect, misuse of the product by the plaintiff or by some other
party may be found to be the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent."' Even where the misuse has been found to be a proximate
cause of the injury, a few courts have discarded the all-or-nothing
principles of causation if the product has been determined to be
defective and have only reduced the plaintiff's damages by the per-
centage of the cause contributed by the misuse.1'" Professor Twerski
has found merit in apportioning proximate cause. 1 He reasons
that it is possible to apportion cause since the concept is a legal
fiction, very similar to fault, designed to "help us decide whether
145 Id.
146 Wade, supra note 35, at 384.
147 Id.
14 Comment h provides that "[a] product is not in a defective condition when
it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from ab-
normal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a radiator to
remove the cap, . . . the seller is not liable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
402A, comment h (1965).
119 See Hays v. Western Auto Supply Co., 405 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1966)
(plaintiff injured when his eight-year-old brother backed over him with a riding
lawnmower).
1
-" See Sun Valley Airlines Corp. v. Avco-LyComing Corp., 411 F. Supp.
598 (D. Idaho 1976) (plaintiff not barred from recovery following jury's de-
termination that 90% of cause of crash could be attributed to plaintiff's misuse);
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
151 Twerski, supra note 46, at 432.
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the harm is to be placed at the defendant's doorstep. 1
The Model Act has incorporated most of these principles into
section 112(C). Since subsection (1) limits misuse to conduct not
"expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent person who is likely
to use the product,"1 " what has traditionally been known as fore-
seeable misuse apparently has no application whatsoever. In re-
gard to the types of misuse which negate the causation portion of
the plaintiff's case, subsection (2) expressly provides that "the
trier of fact may determine that the harm arose solely because of
product misuse.... Section 112 is also consistent with the notion
of apportioning proximate cause because the trier of fact is to
consider "both the nature of the conduct of each person or entity
responsible and the extent of the proximate causal relation between
the conduct and the damages claimed."....
Section 112 (C), however, is not void of problems. The potential
reduction of the manufacturer's liability when a third party's mis-
use has caused a portion or all of the harm is equitable only when
the misuse has rendered the product non-defectiv&'" or when the
misuse is the sole cause of the accident."' When the product is
in fact defective and the third party's misuse is also a cause of
the injury, it is suggested that the manufacturer of the defective
product should be jointly liable to the claimant for the third party's
portion of responsibility. Since the manufacturer has released a
defective product, the burden of collecting the third party's por-
tion of liability should be upon it, not upon the injured party."'
D. Alteration or Modification of a Product
Section 112(D) provides:
(1) "Alteration or modification" occurs when a person or en-
tity other than the product seller changes the design, construction,
152 Id.
153 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
t m Id.
15 Id. at 62,735.
156 For example, if a plaintiff is injured while using a soda bottle as a
hammer the manufacturer will not be held responsible. This nonliability results
not because of a valid defense but because, in this instance, the product simply
was not defective. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 172.
"5'See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
"ZB See note 131 supra.
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or formula of the product, or changes or removes warnings or in-
structions that accompanied or were displayed on the product.
"Alteration or modification" of a product includes the failure to
observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordi-
nary wear and tear.
(2) When the product seller proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that an alteration or modification of the product by the
claimant, or by a party other than the claimant, or the product
seller, has caused the claimant's harm, the claimant's damages
shall be subject to reduction or apportionment to the extent that
the alteration or modification was a cause of the harm. Under this
Subsection, the trier of fact may determine that the harm arose
solely because of the product alteration or modification.'
The above section is not applicable if the alteration or modifi-
cation was made pursuant to the seller's instructions" or after
receipt of his express or implied consent"' or if it was reasonably
anticipated conduct and the product was defective because of a
failure to provide adequate warning."' The trier of fact may deter-
mine that a third party who is not immune under state or federal
law and who has altered or modified the product may be subject to
liability to the claimant.'
Under the Draft version of the UPLA, the provisions pertaining
to product alteration or modification were placed in a different
section which was applicable to third parties only."" Any modifica-
tion or alteration by the claimant was considered equivalent to
misuse and therefore was covered by the section pertaining to
misuse.' It is submitted that the two forms of conduct are not
equivalent and that their differences are important since the Model
Act now distinguishes between a claimant's misconduct and a
claimant's modification or alteration of the product, with different
rules pertaining to each action. '" Their differences can be illustrated
by an examination of the facts in General Motors Corp. v. Hop-
"' 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737. (UPLA 1 12(D)).
11144 Fed. Reg. at 62,739. (UPLA 1 12(D)(2)(a)).
'6 Id. (UPLA § 112(D)(2)(b)).
1621d. (UPLA § 112(D)(2)(c)).
'-Id. (UPLA § 112(D)(3)).
'"Draft UPLA, supra note 103, at 3000.
"Id. at 3012.
"'Compare UPLA § 112(C), supra note 132, with UPLA § 112(D) and
text accompanying notes 159-63 supra.
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kins.67 In Hopkins, the plaintiff driver was severely injured in an
automobile accident due to his truck's continued acceleration des-
pite his release of the accelerator pedal.' 8 The jury found that the
truck's carburetor was defectively designed and was a producing
cause of the accident.' 0 The jury also found that the plaintiff had
made changes in the carburetor during the course of its removal
and reinstallation and that this "misuse" was also a producing
cause of the accident.""0 The conduct in Hopkins was not a misuse
but an alteration of the product. The carburetor was used on the
correct model of the truck for which it had been designed; the
problem was that it had been altered.
One of the traditional problems with regard to product altera-
tion or modification pertained to language in the Restatement
which placed liability on the manufacturer if the product was
"expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition it is sold.''. Whether the product
had been changed substantially, thereby exonerating the manu-
facturer, became an important issue and a number of theories
were developed to facilitate its determination.'" For example, a
manufacturer's liability has been held to be discharged when the
product experiences change in identity" or a change which is
unforeseeable.'" The main theory, however, involves principles of
causation. Since the plaintiff in strict products liability cases is
required to prove that the defect caused his injury,'" the courts
16 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
162 General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. 1977).
169 Id.
170 Id. The court held that if a defective product is a producing cause of the
injury, and if the plaintiff's misuse is a proximate cause, the trier of fact must
determine the percentages contributed to the event by the two causes (totaling
100%) and must award damages accordingly. Id. at 352.
171 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
17 See generally Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product as
a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 245 (1976).
"71 See Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957) (employer's
alteration of portable conveyor by increasing its height, modifying its center of
gravity, and making extensive repairs rendered a far different product than that
purchased).
'
74 See Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir. 1974) (use of
steel mill transfer table with elevated rails five feet apart as work platform not
foreseeable).
'I See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 30 at 143.
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have often held the manufacturer not liable if the defect was cre-
ated by an alteration which amounts to an intervening or super-
seding cause."' Even if the product contained a pre-existing defect,
a showing that an alteration was the sole cause of the injury has
exonerated the manufacturer." Conversely, if the injury was caused
by the manufacturer's defect an alteration of the product does not
prevent the imposition of strict liability.'"'
A potential area of conflict exists concerning the Model Act's
application to situations where neither the manufacturer's defect
nor the alteration was the sole cause of the injury. In such a
situation, the manufacturer has released a defective product which
is partially responsible for the plaintiff's injury and the courts may
justifiably be reluctant to reduce the manufacturer's liability. For
example, in Wells v. Web Machinery Co.'" the plaintiff was in-
jured by a defectively designed punch press. His employer had
also installed a defective unit switch and the injury would not
have occurred without the presence of the defective switch.'"
The court refused to release the manufacturer from liability, point-
ing out that the "press was unsafe and harmful at delivery because
of its design irrespective of any defective component part.''.
Although comparative principles were not available in Wells,
it is arguable that the same reasoning would apply to prevent the
application of those principles. The argument is especially persua-
sive in a situation like that in Wells where the claimant is inno-
cent and the alteration or modification was made by some third
party. In this situation, the Model Act provides that the claimant's
damages shall be reduced or apportioned "to the extent that the
alteration or modification was a cause of the harm.'' Therefore,
in a setting similar to that of Wells where the employer is re-
"'See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251, 1253 (1972).
"77See generally Texas Metal Fab. Co. v. Northern Gas Prods. Corp., 404
F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1968) (owner's actions in bracing loose tubes of heat
exchanger caused explosion).
178 See Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (installation
by plaintiff of fifth wheel did not affect tractor manufacturer's liability for defec-
tive steering mechanism).
1720 Ill. App. 3d 545, 315 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
"IId. at 553, 315 N.E.2d at 309.
"1Id.
1" 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,737.
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sponsible for the alteration or modification, the manufacturer's
liability to the employee would be reduced, possibly by a very
large percentage, and the employee's recovery against the em-
ployer would be barred by workmen's compensation laws.' Such
a result would substantially erode traditional sanctions concerning
a manufacturer's strict liability for distributing a defective prod-
uct.'" A better result would be to continue to impose strict lia-
bility on the manufacturer, rendering him liable for a third party's
alteration or modification, and to allow the manufacturer to ob-
tain reimbursement from the third party in accordance with the
percentages of fault which are determined by the trier of fact."
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it appears that a substantial number of commentators
and jurisdictions are willing to compare the plaintiff's and defend-
ant's respective misconduct in a products liability setting, it is
quite possible that they may have made the decision to do so
without proper consideration of the rationale behind products
liability. The principle of comparative negligence is a giant leap
toward fairness and reality in a negligence setting, the question
is whether it should apply in a products liability setting. To make
that application is tempting, for the adoption of comparative prin-
ciples has become increasingly popular in recent years'" as a
method of equitable apportionment, requiring the negligent party
to compensate the plaintiff for only those damages for which he
is, in fact, responsible. Moreover, the application of comparative
principles could greatly simplify many difficult product liability
issues. Assume, for example, that the manufacturer has produced
a defective product which has been tampered with by the plaintiff,
and that the jury has concluded that both parties caused the in-
jury; it is tempting and more practical to hand the problem to the
jury, requesting that they determine each party's percentage of
183 Id. at 62,738.
'"Professor Walkowiak has stressed the importance of "concentration upon
elimination of primary losses through the imposition of liability upon those
parties who can best bear the burden of compensating for losses . . " Walkowiak,
supra note 109, at 697. See note 20 supra.
'
5
'See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
'"See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 1.
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fault, and simply split the damages accordingly.18 '
The true problem is not whether the two concepts can be com-
pared, but whether the two should be compared. All other things
being equal, if the aggregate result of applying comparative negli-
gence principles to products liability litigation is a reduction of
the amount of damages the manufacturer will have to pay, a by-
product of that result may very well be an increase in the number
of defective products. If the manufacturer's decision to change the
position of an automobile's gas tank is based upon economics,
i.e., a comparison of the costs involved in making the change
with the costs involved in potential lawsuits should the change be
rejected, marketing the product without any change may be worth
the risk incurred and the smaller amount of predicted costs.'"
A more difficult solution to this question is advocated by at least
"'See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). One
response to this contention may be that the function of the jury is not one of
an inadequate problem-solver, but that it is an appropriate method for spreading
the costs of the injury over society as a whole. If so, the argument follows, the
jury should also determine how much of the burden a claimant should bear be-
cause of his own conduct.
It is submitted, however, that before the jury begins such a determination
the court should closely examine the litigation's impact on the policies support-
ing products liability. Professor Walkowiak concludes that if the acts of the
plaintiff are those which the manufacturer was expected to consider and protect
against, the jury should not even consider such acts in its determination of lia-
bility. Walkowiak, supra note 109, at 679.
188 During the reckless homicide trial of the Ford Motor Company which
pertained to its design of the 1973 Pinto, Harley Copp, a former Ford executive,
testified that a plan to modify the design which would have required an expense
of $6.65 per car was rejected because of "cost and the effect it would have on
profitability." Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1980, at 2, col. 4.
The Model Act's punitive damage section would offer little deterrence to a
manufacturer in this situation. A large manufacturer could arguably conceal
evidence of any damaging conduct, preventing the plaintiff from meeting his
already sizable burden of proving "by clear and convincing evidence" that the
manufacturer acted in "reckless disregard for the safety of product users." 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,748. Although the Ford Motor Company has been held liable,
at least at the trial level, for millions of dollars of damages in regard to the
design of the Pinto, see Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 7927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (plaintiff awarded
$1,740,000 in damages resulting from manufacturer's failure to warn of po-
tential danger in gas tank design); Wall St. J., April 7, 1978, at 10, col. 4
(California state court awarded plaintiff $3.5 million in punitive damages due to
auto maker's knowledge of hazardous design), important evidence in the Pinto
litigation was obtained from a former Ford executive. In the average product
liability setting, an individual who has knowledge of the manufacturer's wrongful
conduct and is willing to testify against that manufacturer will probably not be
available.
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two commentators. Professor Twerski has warned that the appli-
cation of the principles of comparative fault must not "negate
basic duties that have been placed on manufacturers. 189 Accord-
ingly, he advocates the use of comparative fault only in cases "in
which the role of the plaintiff's conduct with regard to maintain-
ing product integrity is significant or those in which the plaintiff
has pushed the product beyond the limits of its capacities." ''
Similarly, Professor Walkowiak has suggested that the plaintiff's
conduct should not be taken into consideration when the defect
is one of design, consciously made by the manufacturer.19'
Even if the risk of shrinking the manufacturer's basic duties is
not considered persuasive evidence against the application of across-
the-board comparative fault principles, certain provisions of the
UPLA can be improved. First, the determination that a claimant
should not be required to inspect the product should not turn
upon the obviousness of the defective condition. Requiring that
the claimant observe an apparent defective condition is in sub-
stance requiring that he inspect the product, a requirement which
this act has professed to have decided against.199 Such a provision
will not alleviate the considerable litigation and expense which is
associated with determining the issue of knowledge of the defect,
but will merely redirect them to the issue of whether the defective
condition was apparent. '93
Second, the manufacturer's liability to the claimant should not be
reduced because of some third party's misconduct if the product
is found to be defective and has contributed to the claimant's in-
juries. A better result is to hold the manufacturer jointly and sev-
erally liable for an amount which includes the liability attributable
189 Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Lia-
bility, 10 IND. L. REV. 797, 829 (1977).
19OTwerski, supra note 46, at 434.
"9 Professor Walkowiak concludes:
If the acts which constitute a defense in conscious design choice
litigation are acts of a claimant that the manufacturer was expected
to consider and protect against in the selection of design choice,
it is not in the interests of the goal of primary loss limitation to
permit foreseeable user conduct to constitute a defense to the action.
Walkowiak, supra note 109, at 679. See note 184 supra.
192 Id.
"I See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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to the third party's misconduct and to allow the manufacturer to
seek contribution from the third party in accordance with that
party's percentage of responsibility as determined by the trier of
fact. To do so would simply place the burden of collecting the
third party's portion of the liability as well as the risk of non-
collection, on the manufacturer, an equitable result since the
manufacturer did in fact produce and sell a defective product.

